The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s summary judgment in favor of a former nursing home resident’s attorney-in-fact, ruling that he was not personally liable for the former resident’s debt to the facility because he had not signed the agreement and had not engaged in fraudulent transfers. Concord Village Skilled Nursing & Rehab. v. Lundquist, No. 2025-L-033 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2025)
In March 2022, Helen Lundquist entered into a written agreement for admission to Concord Village Skilled Nursing & Rehabilitation, Ltd. (Concord Village), a long-term care facility, under which Concord Village was obligated to provide services to Helen at a daily rate of $325. The agreement required Helen to pay expenses not covered by Medicare or another payor. She resided at Concord Village from March 2022 to December 2022.
Helen had granted a limited power of attorney to her son, Terrance Tabaczynski, before entering into the agreement with Concord Village. Less than six months after entering into the agreement, Helen executed a transfer-on-death (TOD) designation affidavit for her personal residence naming Terrance as the beneficiary and a durable power of attorney naming Terrance as her agent. Helen and Terrance also had a joint bank account.
Helen did not make all her contractually obligated payments and was ultimately discharged from the facility for nonpayment. In 2024, Concord Village filed a complaint against Helen, Terrance, and other parties seeking damages, including $66,627.23 for services rendered. The trial court granted Concord Village’s motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim against Helen but granted summary judgment in favor of Terrance on all of Concord Village’s claims against him. Concord Village appealed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Terrance.
In a de novo review, the Ohio Court of Appeals rejected Concord Village’s argument that Terrance had negligently failed to pay amounts Helen owed it and was personally liable under 42 C.F.R. § 483.15(a)(3) and a similar Ohio regulation: Those regulations prohibit nursing facilities from requesting or requiring a third party to guarantee payment as a condition of admission but allow them to request or require a resident’s representative who has legal access to the resident’s income or resources to sign a contract to provide payments to the facility from the resident’s income or resources without incurring personal liability. The court found that there was no evidence that Terrance had signed an agreement with Concord Village in his individual capacity or as Helen’s attorney-in-fact. Thus, he had no duty to pay Helen’s debt to Concord Village.
The court also rejected Concord Village’s assertion that Helen’s execution of a TOD designation affidavit regarding her real property naming Terrance as the beneficiary and his withdrawals from their joint bank account were fraudulent transfers under Ohio law. Under Ohio’s fraudulent transfer law, Concord Village was required to show that Helen was insolvent or would be made so by the transfer at issue and that the transfer was made without fair consideration. However, the evidence showed that Helen was not insolvent and had assets exceeding her debt to Concord Village. In addition, the POA executed by Helen granted Terrance the authority to make financial decisions, withdrawals, and deposits but did not transfer ownership rights to him and her execution of the TOD designation affidavit did not transfer an ownership interest in her real property to Terrance, who would have no interest in the real property until after Helen’s death.
Further, Ohio’s fraudulent transfer law required Concord Village to prove the transfer of an asset or incurrence of a new debt with an actual intent to defraud, hinder, or delay present or future creditors. The court held that, although Terrance had not properly contested Concord Village’s assertions that certain badges of fraud were present and that his transfers from the joint bank account to pay his mortgage and utilities were fraudulent transfers, the trial court had all relevant evidence before it and nothing in the record demonstrated that the transfers were fraudulent.
The court also ruled that the trial court had not improperly weighed the evidence on Concord Village’s fraudulent transfer claim where there was no conflict between Terrance’s affidavit, the language of the POA, and deposition testimony, which all supported his position that the POA granted him the authority—but not an obligation—to act.
In addition, the court rejected Concord Village’s argument that the trial court had erred by not finding Terrance personally liable for alleged failures as Helen’s attorney-in-fact under Ohio’s Uniform Power of Attorney Act. The court found that those alleged failures were not appropriately before the court because neither the POA nor Helen’s agreement with Concord Village created an obligation for him to act.
Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
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