The Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California, finds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sustained objections based on discrimination in the jury selection process of an elder abuse trial. Substantial evidence supports the finding that the defendant committed elder abuse likely to produce great bodily harm, and the jury instruction as to great bodily harm was clear. In sentencing, the trial court properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the defendant cannot raise sentencing issues for the first time on appeal. In People v. Caparrotta (Cal. Ct. App. No. D083314, July 16, 2024).
Marcelo Caparrotta assaulted his elderly father, injuring his face, ear, and arm. Later, he left a voicemail threatening to harm his father again. According to a social worker’s report, Mr. Caparrotta was a victim of abuse as a child. A jury found Mr. Caparrotta guilty of elder abuse likely to produce great bodily harm or death and making a criminal threat. The trial court gave him a moderate sentence, considering his history of abuse. It also imposed fines, including a restitution fine.
On appeal, Mr. Caparrotta argued that the trial court erred when it sustained the state’s objections to his council’s challenges during the jury selection. When the defense counsel challenged jurors 17 and 19, the state brought Section 231.7(a) objections, which the trial court sustained.
Section 231.7(a) prohibits peremptory challenges based on race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation. When an opposing party presents an 231.7(a) objection, the court must sustain the objection if it sees a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would view the challenge to be based on a protected quality. Per Section 231.7(g), rationales typically suggesting discrimination include inattentiveness, lack of rapport or bad attitude, and unintelligent or confused responses.
When challenging juror 17, the defense counsel cited the way the juror answered some questions, her body language, and her connections to law enforcement. Challenging the second juror, Mr. Caparrotta’s counsel pointed to the juror’s inability to stay seated, pay attention, and listen to evidence impartially.
On appeal, Mr. Caparrotta argued the trial court failed to look at the totality of the circumstances. However, there is no totality of the circumstances analysis under 231.7(g). The trial court first evaluates whether it can confirm the behavior. Second, counsel must explain why the behavior matters to the case.
Although the defense counsel included a facially neutral reason to challenge juror 17, the trial court must sustain an objection that fails to pass the two-step process in section 231.7(g). This is consistent with the legislature’s intent to prevent discrimination.
Substantial evidence supports the finding that Mr. Caparrotta committed elder abuse likely to cause death or great bodily harm. Mr. Caparrotta argued that his father did not suffer a great bodily injury. However, case law establishes that a defendant can be found to have acted under conditions likely to result in great bodily harm or death without causing a serious injury. Because he struck his father and caused him to fall, and his father is in his late 70s, such a conclusion is reasonable for the jury.
Next, Mr. Caparrotta argued that the jury should not have been instructed to evaluate conditions giving rise to great bodily harm because the phrase was ambiguous. Yet the definition of great bodily harm is clear. The jurors understood it meant significant injury, not moderate harm.
He also asserted that the court erred by not considering a presumptive lower-term sentence due to his childhood experience of abuse as a mitigating factor. When there is a mitigating factor such as childhood abuse, Penal Code section 1170(b)(6) requires a sentence no more severe than moderate. It provides that if childhood abuse was a mitigating factor, the court must give the lowest sentence. However, there is an exception. The court may order a moderate sentence if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, making the lowest sentence unjust. In giving the moderate sentence, the trial court properly considered both the aggravating and the mitigating factors. The record indicates that the trial court correctly applied Penal Code section 1170(b)(6).
Mr. Caparrotta further disputed the fines he had to pay, claiming the court failed to explain its reasoning. When imposing a restitution fine, the trial court did not have to explain its reasoning. Moreover, Mr. Caparrotta cannot challenge the trial court’s discretion for the first time on appeal. He also cannot now raise the claim that the court failed to consider his ability to pay because he did not object at sentencing.
The appellate court affirms the trial court’s decision.
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