The Sixth Circuit holds that the district court lacked statutory authority to amend a restitution order for elder financial abuse, even though the financial abuser was the deceased victim’s sole beneficiary and would therefore receive the funds. In United States v. O’Hara (6th Cir. Nos. 23-5695/5720, August 20, 2024).
John O’Hara pleaded guilty to defrauding his mother of over $300,000. By the time of sentencing, his mother was deceased. Sans government objection, the court sentenced Mr. O’Hara to pay restitution to his mother’s estate. It was apparent that he was the sole beneficiary.
Four years later, Mr. O’Hara had yet to pay restitution, and the district court sought the government’s position on the restitution issue. The government argued that the restitution should go to the Crime Victims Fund instead of the estate because a perpetrator cannot be a victim under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA). Agreeing with the state that allowing a perpetrator to receive restitution would go against the purpose of the act, the district court amended the judgment, substituting the fund for the estate.
Following Mr. O’Hara’s appeal, the Sixth Circuit reviews whether the district court had the authority to modify its final judgment to substitute a new payee.
A court needs statutory authority to amend a sentence, including a restitution order. Here, no statute supported the amendment. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(o) states that a court may amend a restitution order if the victim’s losses cannot be determined at sentencing or when the defendant is resentenced or experiences a change in economic circumstances. None of these apply to this case. The MVRA applied at sentencing; its language does not allow the district court to modify the sentence, even though the modification makes practical sense. The district court had the opportunity to order restitution to the fund at the initial sentencing, as the court and the state knew Mr. O’Hara was his mother’s sole beneficiary.
The Sixth Circuit reverses and remands the case.