Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel, although never married, had two daughters. After Ms. Granville and Brad separated in 1991, Brad lived with his parents, Jenifer and Gary Troxel, and regularly brought his daughters to his parents' home for weekend visits. Brad committed suicide in May 1993. Although the Troxels at first continued to see the daughters on a regular basis, Ms. Granville informed the Troxels in October 1993 that she wished to limit their visitation with her daughters to one visit a month. In December 1993, the Troxels filed a petition in the Washington Superior Court to obtain visitation rights under a Washington statute that provides: "Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances." Rev. Code §26.10.160(3) (1994).
At trial, the Troxels requested two weekends of overnight visitation a month and two weeks of visitation each summer. Ms. Granville asked the court to order one day of visitation per month with no overnight stays. In 1995, the Superior Court struck a compromise, ordering visitation one weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on both of the petitioning grandparents' birthdays.
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's visitation order and dismissed the Troxels' petition for visitation, ruling that nonparents lack standing to seek visitation under §26.10.160(3) unless a custody action is pending. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals ruling, holding that §26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
By a 6 to 3 majority the court rejects the Troxels' request for extended visitation. Writing for a plurality of four justices, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor concludes that §26.10.160(3), as applied by the Superior Court, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, the Court writes, "protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." The Court finds a presumption that "fit parents act in the best interests of their children." "[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children." The Court criticizes the Superior Court for giving no special weight to Ms. Granville's determination of her daughters' best interests, and in fact applying "exactly the opposite presumption."
However, while characterizing the Washington statute as "breathtakingly broad," the Court declines to consider the constitutional question passed on by the Washington Supreme Court--whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation. "Because much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis," the court writes, "we would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter."
Justices Stevens, Scalia and Kennedy offer dissenting opinions. In his dissent, Justice Stevens voices concern that the majority opinion gives undue weight to the wishes of parents. He notes that those seeking visitation can include "a once-custodial caregiver, an intimate relation, or even a genetic parent." Observing that "even a fit parent is capable of treating a child like a mere possession," Justice Stevens argues that "the constitutional protection against arbitrary state interference with parental rights should not be extended to prevent the States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an interest in the welfare of the child." Washington's statute, he says, accords those seeking visitation "the procedural right to ask the State to act as arbiter, through the entirely well-known best-interests standard, between the parent's protected interests and the child's."
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