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Brother Lacked Standing to Terminate Conservatorship
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s denial of a motion filed by the brother of a mentally ill woman to terminate her conservatorship because he lacked standing. Because he had stolen funds left by their mother for his sister’s care and taken further actions to permanently deprive her of those funds, he did not fall within the statutory definition of a person interested in a protected person’s welfare who could move for termination of his sister’s conservatorship. Black v. Goodwin, No. 23CA1197 (Colo. Ct. App. May 22, 2025).
Joanne and Bernard Black were siblings. When their mother died in 2012, she left Joanne, who suffered from a mental illness, substantial funds from payable-on-death (POD) bank accounts and two-thirds of the remainder of her estate, which was to be placed in a special needs trust (SNT) for Joanne’s benefit. She left one-third of the remainder of her estate to Bernard.
Bernard filed a petition for a conservatorship over Joanne and, as her conservator, obtained the probate court’s approval to disclaim the POD designations on the bank accounts. He transferred part of the funds into Joanne’s SNT as co-trustee and part of it into a trust for the benefit of himself and his children. In 2015, the probate court determined that Bernard had breached his fiduciary duties and stolen $1.5 million of Joanne’s assets for himself. The court removed him as Joanne’s conservator and appointed another conservator. The court did not void the disclaimer, but entered a judgment for treble damages of $4.6 million against Bernard.
However, over the course of ten years, Bernard did not pay the judgment or return the stolen funds. Rather, he moved Joanne’s funds into other trusts and engaged in meritless litigation in attempts to permanently deprive Joanne of the funds their mother intended for her long-term care. After the probate court scheduled a hearing to determine whether the probate court could vacate its previous order approving the disclaimer, Bernard filed a motion to terminate Joanne’s conservatorship, arguing that in 2016, a New York court had found Joanne to be competent and that the probate court’s orders after that date were void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The probate court denied Bernard’s motion, finding that termination of the conservatorship was not in Joanne’s best interests and that Bernard had filed the motion in bad faith to delay the proceedings regarding the disclaimer.
The Colorado Court of Appeals found that under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-14-431(3), Bernard must be a protected person, a conservator, or another person interested in the protected person’s welfare to have standing. Bernard asserted that he was an interested person, a trustee, and someone interested in Joanne’s welfare. The court noted that the probate court had removed Bernard as trustee of any trust holding conservatorship assets. Bernard did not assert that he was a protected person or a conservator, and thus, the court determined that the only question was whether he was a person interested in Joanne’s welfare who should be permitted to act on her behalf to terminate the conservatorship.
The court held that section 15-14-431(3) was not ambiguous and that its plain language showed the legislature’s intent to limit standing to terminate a conservatorship to those who have an interest in the welfare of a protected person—meaning those who have a genuine concern for their well-being. According to the court, there was no factual dispute regarding whether Bernard acted out of concern for Joanne’s wellbeing: To the contrary, the facts of the case demonstrated that he was the antithesis of someone interested in her welfare, having engaged in deception and fraud to serve his interests at her expense and deprive her of assets her mother intended for her care. Thus, the court affirmed the probate court’s ruling, finding that as a matter of law, Bernard did not qualify as a person interested in Joanne’s welfare and therefore lacked standing to seek the termination of the conservatorship. In addition, the court awarded Joanne’s conservator reasonable attorney’s fees on the ground that the appeal was frivolous and vexatious. It remanded the case to the probate court to determine the amount.
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Brother Lacked Standing to Terminate Conservatorship
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s denial of a motion filed by the brother of a mentally ill woman to terminate her conservatorship because he lacked standing. Because he had stolen funds left by their mother for his sister’s care and taken further actions to permanently deprive her of those funds, he did not fall within the statutory definition of a person interested in a protected person’s welfare who could move for termination of his sister’s conservatorship. Black v. Goodwin, No. 23CA1197 (Colo. Ct. App. May 22, 2025).
Joanne and Bernard Black were siblings. When their mother died in 2012, she left Joanne, who suffered from a mental illness, substantial funds from payable-on-death (POD) bank accounts and two-thirds of the remainder of her estate, which was to be placed in a special needs trust (SNT) for Joanne’s benefit. She left one-third of the remainder of her estate to Bernard.
Bernard filed a petition for a conservatorship over Joanne and, as her conservator, obtained the probate court’s approval to disclaim the POD designations on the bank accounts. He transferred part of the funds into Joanne’s SNT as co-trustee and part of it into a trust for the benefit of himself and his children. In 2015, the probate court determined that Bernard had breached his fiduciary duties and stolen $1.5 million of Joanne’s assets for himself. The court removed him as Joanne’s conservator and appointed another conservator. The court did not void the disclaimer, but entered a judgment for treble damages of $4.6 million against Bernard.
However, over the course of ten years, Bernard did not pay the judgment or return the stolen funds. Rather, he moved Joanne’s funds into other trusts and engaged in meritless litigation in attempts to permanently deprive Joanne of the funds their mother intended for her long-term care. After the probate court scheduled a hearing to determine whether the probate court could vacate its previous order approving the disclaimer, Bernard filed a motion to terminate Joanne’s conservatorship, arguing that in 2016, a New York court had found Joanne to be competent and that the probate court’s orders after that date were void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The probate court denied Bernard’s motion, finding that termination of the conservatorship was not in Joanne’s best interests and that Bernard had filed the motion in bad faith to delay the proceedings regarding the disclaimer.
The Colorado Court of Appeals found that under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-14-431(3), Bernard must be a protected person, a conservator, or another person interested in the protected person’s welfare to have standing. Bernard asserted that he was an interested person, a trustee, and someone interested in Joanne’s welfare. The court noted that the probate court had removed Bernard as trustee of any trust holding conservatorship assets. Bernard did not assert that he was a protected person or a conservator, and thus, the court determined that the only question was whether he was a person interested in Joanne’s welfare who should be permitted to act on her behalf to terminate the conservatorship.
The court held that section 15-14-431(3) was not ambiguous and that its plain language showed the legislature’s intent to limit standing to terminate a conservatorship to those who have an interest in the welfare of a protected person—meaning those who have a genuine concern for their well-being. According to the court, there was no factual dispute regarding whether Bernard acted out of concern for Joanne’s wellbeing: To the contrary, the facts of the case demonstrated that he was the antithesis of someone interested in her welfare, having engaged in deception and fraud to serve his interests at her expense and deprive her of assets her mother intended for her care. Thus, the court affirmed the probate court’s ruling, finding that as a matter of law, Bernard did not qualify as a person interested in Joanne’s welfare and therefore lacked standing to seek the termination of the conservatorship. In addition, the court awarded Joanne’s conservator reasonable attorney’s fees on the ground that the appeal was frivolous and vexatious. It remanded the case to the probate court to determine the amount.
Brother Lacked Standing to Terminate Conservatorship
<p><img alt="Case study for the Academy of Special Needs Planners" src="https://cdn.elderlawanswers.com/common/uploads/photos/19452-ASNP Badge Case Summary.jpg" style="float:right; height:200px; margin-left:10px; margin-right:10px; width:356px" />The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s denial of a motion filed by the brother of a mentally ill woman to terminate her conservatorship because he lacked standing. Because he had stolen funds left by their mother for his sister’s care and taken further actions to permanently deprive her of those funds, he did not fall within the statutory definition of a person interested in a protected person’s welfare who could move for termination of his sister’s conservatorship. <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/2025/23ca1197.html" target="_self">Black v. Goodwin</a>, No. 23CA1197 (Colo. Ct. App. May 22, 2025).</p>
<p>Joanne and Bernard Black were siblings. When their mother died in 2012, she left Joanne, who suffered from a mental illness, substantial funds from payable-on-death (POD) bank accounts and two-thirds of the remainder of her estate, which was to be placed in a special needs trust (SNT) for Joanne’s benefit. She left one-third of the remainder of her estate to Bernard. </p>
<p>Bernard filed a petition for a conservatorship over Joanne and, as her conservator, obtained the probate court’s approval to disclaim the POD designations on the bank accounts. He transferred part of the funds into Joanne’s SNT as co-trustee and part of it into a trust for the benefit of himself and his children. In 2015, the probate court determined that Bernard had breached his fiduciary duties and stolen $1.5 million of Joanne’s assets for himself. The court removed him as Joanne’s conservator and appointed another conservator. The court did not void the disclaimer, but entered a judgment for treble damages of $4.6 million against Bernard. </p>
<p>However, over the course of ten years, Bernard did not pay the judgment or return the stolen funds. Rather, he moved Joanne’s funds into other trusts and engaged in meritless litigation in attempts to permanently deprive Joanne of the funds their mother intended for her long-term care. After the probate court scheduled a hearing to determine whether the probate court could vacate its previous order approving the disclaimer, Bernard filed a motion to terminate Joanne’s conservatorship, arguing that in 2016, a New York court had found Joanne to be competent and that the probate court’s orders after that date were void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The probate court denied Bernard’s motion, finding that termination of the conservatorship was not in Joanne’s best interests and that Bernard had filed the motion in bad faith to delay the proceedings regarding the disclaimer.</p>
<p>The Colorado Court of Appeals found that under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-14-431(3), Bernard must be a protected person, a conservator, or another person interested in the protected person’s welfare to have standing. Bernard asserted that he was an interested person, a trustee, and someone interested in Joanne’s welfare. The court noted that the probate court had removed Bernard as trustee of any trust holding conservatorship assets. Bernard did not assert that he was a protected person or a conservator, and thus, the court determined that the only question was whether he was a person interested in Joanne’s welfare who should be permitted to act on her behalf to terminate the conservatorship.</p>
<p>The court held that section 15-14-431(3) was not ambiguous and that its plain language showed the legislature’s intent to limit standing to terminate a conservatorship to those who have an interest in the welfare of a protected person—meaning those who have a genuine concern for their well-being. According to the court, there was no factual dispute regarding whether Bernard acted out of concern for Joanne’s wellbeing: To the contrary, the facts of the case demonstrated that he was the antithesis of someone interested in her welfare, having engaged in deception and fraud to serve his interests at her expense and deprive her of assets her mother intended for her care. Thus, the court affirmed the probate court’s ruling, finding that as a matter of law, Bernard did not qualify as a person interested in Joanne’s welfare and therefore lacked standing to seek the termination of the conservatorship. In addition, the court awarded Joanne’s conservator reasonable attorney’s fees on the ground that the appeal was frivolous and vexatious. It remanded the case to the probate court to determine the amount.</p>
<p><a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/2025/23ca1197.html" target="_self">Read the full opinion</a>.</p>
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The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s denial of a motion filed by the brother of a mentally ill woman to terminate her conservatorship because he lacked standing. Because he had stolen funds left by their mother for his sister’s care and taken further actions to permanently deprive her of those funds, he did not fall within the statutory definition of a person interested in a protected person’s welfare who could move for termination of his sister’s conservatorship. Black v. Goodwin, No. 23CA1197 (Colo. Ct. App. May 22, 2025).
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